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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of 
habeas corpus on February 17, 1971, by the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted of murder in the second 
degree on December 11, 1968. Appellant's conviction 
for the crime of murder in the second degree was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970). 
Subsequent to this the appellant's writ of habeas corpus 
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was denied on February 17, 1971, by the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft, in a rnemorarnlum decision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm the 
judgment of the lower court denying appellant's writ 
of habeas corpus. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS 
The body of Clare Odell .Mortensen was discov-
ered by his sister. The body was in a closet, nude ( T. 
213). A cloth was around the decedent's face tight 
enough to be in his mouth ( T. 507). He was bound by 
leather thongs and a silk-like cord. The thongs were 
tied around the victim's wrist and interwoven between 
the silk-like cord Yvhich tied the ankles to the wrists (T. 
508) . The back door of the residence was ajar ( T. 206). 
According to expert testimony, the cause of the 
death of Clare Odell l\Iortensen was the ligature around 
his neck which restricted the flow of blood from the 
head ·which caused the blood vessels on the brain to 
swell and burst ('I'. 512). This was caused by a cloth 
tied around his neck tight enough that one would have 
difficulty putting his finger urnlerneath it ( T. 508). Dr. 
James T. \V eston, the medical examiner who performed 
the autopsy, concluded that the purpose of the cloth was 
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to heighten erotic stimulus during an act of sodomy and 
that it was placed there by one who assisted in the 
erotic act ( T. 7 5!)) . The time of death was between noon 
and 10:00 p.m. July 4, 1968 (T. 513). 
Dr. James T. 'V eston also found that there was a 
high concentration of acid phosphate within the deced-
ent's rectum as well as within his mouth (T. 520). Acid 
phosphate is one of the enzymes present in male semen. 
Fecal material was found on the decedent's penis (T. 
521). 
The night before his death, the victim was seen in 
lhe company of the appellant at a nightclub by the vic-
tim's mother ( T. 190) . Another witness, Sandra Twitch-
ell, noticed tbe Yictim and the appellant enter the 
nightclub together and she observed the victim invite 
the appellant to go home with him, to which the appellant 
refused ( T. 392). At about 6 :00 a.m. on the 4th of July, 
the appellant was again with the decedent, at the de-
ceclent' s apartment ( T. 631). The appellant testified 
that after 12 :30 p.m. on the 4th of July he never saw 
the decedent again ( T. 626). 
On July 4, 1968, at about 2 :00 p.m. the decedent 
and the appellant were seen by the bartender at The 
Lounge (T. 7'75). They left together at about 4:00 p.m. 
(T. 776). No other witness was found who saw them 
iogether that afternoon. 
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On the night of the murder, the appellant met San-
dra Twitchell at the Roundup at about 8:30 p.m. The 
appellant told her that he wanted to move into a motel 
and that the decedent had flown to Seattle ( T. 395). 
Appellant also told this witness that the victim was 
"kind of queer" and that appellant had busted him (T. 
396). She testified that the appellant seemed much more 
shaky or nervous than before ( T. 398) . 
A neighbor to the decedent testified that she had 
talked with appellant outside the decedent's home at 
9:15 p.m. on July 4 (T. 285). Appellant told this lady 
that his friend (the decedent) had been called unexpect-
edly out of town ( T. 286) . 
Another neighbor testified that he had seen the 
appellant replace a screen on a window in decedent's 
apartrrent on the day after the killing (T. 310). Appel-
lant himself testified that he picked up his belongings 
(T. 641). 
The evidence at the trial showed that the silk-like 
cord used to tie the decedent's wrists and ankles was a 
lace from combat boots (T. 482). The manager of the 
motel where appellant stayed observed appellant's com-
bat boots and testified that they were lacking laces 
(T. 345). 
The appellant moved to a motel and discarded cer-
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tain items of the decedent's personal property (including 
decedent's wallet) in a trash barrel at the motel (T. 
350). The defendant then used the decedent's Walker 
Bankard to obtain money for an airline ticket to Ger-
many. The appellant was arrested by the military au-
thorities in Germany (T. 440). 
Appellant was convicted of murder in the second 
degree on December 11, 1968. Appellant's conviction 
for the crime of murder in the second degree was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 ( 1970). 
Subsequent to this the appellant's writ of habeas corpus 
was denied on February 17, 1971 by the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft, in a memorandum decision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT 
SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED BY THIS 
COURT BECAUSE THI~Y DO NOT PRESENT 
PROPER ISSUES FOR A HABEAS CORPUS 
PROCEEDING. 
A 
THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT 
CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE 
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE SHOULD NOT BE 
REVIE\VED AS IT PRESENTS SUBSTAN-
TIALLY THE SAl\lE ISSUE RAISED ON 
APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL APPEAL FROM 
HIS CONVICTION. 
Point A of Appellant's Argument raises the is-
sue of the legality of the search and seizure of his suit 
cases and the items contained therein. It is argued that 
this resulted in prejudicial error requiring reversal. 
This presents substantially the same issue raised by ap-
pellant and ruled on by this court in his original appeal 
from his conviction. State of Utah v. Schad, 24 Utah 
2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970) at 248, 249. Therefore, 
appellant is using this appeal from the denial of a writ 
of habeas corpus to provide him with another review of 
the same issue raised during the original appeal. This 
is not the purpose of habeas corpus. 
The same conclusion that respondent urges was ex-
pressed in Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 
121 ( 1967). Bryant involved a writ of habeas corpus 
which followed a conviction for second degree murder. 
No appeal was taken from this conviction. The Court 
in Bryant reasoned that the purpose of habeas corpus 
"is not to review a final judgment arrived at through 
regular proceedings and due process of law by a court 
having jurisdiction." Id. at 122. The court said further 
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that to turn habeas corpus into an appellate review 
"should not be done nor countenanced in our proced-
ure .... " Id. at 122. 
An important decision that is even more germane 
to the case at bar is Sinclair v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 
434 P .2d 305 ( 1967) . In Sinclair substantially the same 
issues complained of in the appeal from the denial of a 
writ of habeas corpus were raised and ruled upon in the 
appeal from her conviction. The court stated the fol-
lowing: 
"We took occasion to explain in the re-
cent case of Bryant v. Turner, that it is not a 
proper purpose of a habeas corpus proceed-
ing to provide another review of the same is-
sues that have been previously adjudicated on 
a regular appeal." Id. at 308. 
An identical holding was recently handed down in Scan-
drett v. Turner, ____ Utah 2d .... , 489 P.2d 1186 (1971). 
The court held that a writ of habeas corpus may not be 
used to relitigate issues that had been previously liti-
gated in a regular appeal. The court used this as the 
basis for affirming the trial court's denial of the writ 
of habeas corpus. 
The same problem is presented in the case at bar. 
During the original appeal from his conviction the ap-
pellant raised the issue of the legality of the search and 
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seizure. State v. Schad, supra, at 247. The court in Schad 
ruled on this issue by holding that the admission of the 
evidence seized could not be regarded as reversible error. 
State v. Schad, supra, at 249. In the case at bar, the ap-
pellant is using the appeal from the denial of his writ 
of habeas corpus to relitigate this issue. Under the au-
thority of Sinclair v. Turner, supra, and Scandrett v. 
Turner, supra, habeas corpus may not be used for this 
purpose and this Court in the case at bar should again 
follow this precedent. 
B 
THE ISSUE RAISED BY APPELLANT, 
WHEREIN IT IS ALLEGED THAT INQUIR-
IES :MADE BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
CONCERNING APPELLANT'S PRIOR FEL-
ONY CONVICTIONS RESULTED IN PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR, SHOULD NOT BE RE-
VIE\VED BY TIIIS COURT AS IT SHOULD 
HA VE BEEN RAISED BY REGULAR AP-
PEAL. 
The principle reason why this issue is not proper 
for consideration in this appeal from the denial of a 
writ of habeas corpus is that the appellant, in arguing 
this issue, is attempting to turn the habeas corpus pro-
ceeding into an appellate review. The al1eged irregular-
ity was known or should have been known to the appel-
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lant at the time of judgment or during the time per-
mitte<l for regular appellate review. This being so, the 
issue should have been raised by the regular appeal 
process. Case law in Utah has consistently supported 
this proposition. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Brown v. Turner, 21 
Utah 2d 96, 440 P .2d 968 ( 1968), discussed a number 
of limitations on habeas corpus proceedings. In Bro't.on, 
after emphasizing that habeas corpus cannot properly 
be treated as a regular appellate review, the Court 
stated: 
"If the contention of error is something 
which is known or should be known to the 
party at the time the judgment was entered, 
it must be reviewed in the manner and within 
the time permitted by regular prescribed pro-
cedure, or the judgment becomes final and 
is not subject to further attack. ... " Id. at 969. 
The Brown decision pointed out that there are only a 
few unusual circumstances when the court will review 
an issue in a habeas corpus proceeding that could have 
been raised on appeal. Id. at 969. The first is lack of 
jurisdiction, which is not applicable to the case at bar. 
The second is where the party is substantially and eff ec-
tively denied due process of law. It is not alleged that 
this questioning has substantially denied the appellant 
due proeess of law. The third is that some fact has been 
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shown that it would be unconscionable not to re-examine 
the conviction. This issue does not demonstrate such out-
rageous prejudice so that it could be considered un-
conscionable not to review it. Indeed, the issue raises 
no prejudice to the appellant at all, as is demonstrated 
by Point II of Respondent's Brief. The issue clearly 
does not fall within one of the "unusual circumstances" 
given in Brown, and therefore should have been raised 
by regular appeal. See also ltliller v. Crouse, 346 F.2d 
30 l (10th Cir. 1965) . 
The principles discussed in Brown v. Turner, supra, 
were also considered in Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 
229, 443 P .2d 1020 ( 1968). Velasquez concerned a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus for release of a juvenile 
from the Industrial School. The court's reasoning rele-
vant to the case at bar is as follows: 
"As to any claimed error or irregularity 
which was known or should have been known 
to the appellant at the time of judgment, 
there was first an obligation to call it to the trial 
court's attention and seek remedy; and that 
failing, there was next a duty to seek review 
and correction on appeal. If this is not done 
within the time allowed by law, the judgment 
becomes final and not subject to further at-
tack for any matters which could have been so 
reviewed on regular appeal." Id. at 1022 (Em-
phasis supplied). 
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The alleged irregularity raised by appellant falls 
within the scope of Brown v. Turner, supra, and Velas-
quez v. Pratt, supra. The issue is one that was known 
or should have been known to the appellant in time for 
it to be argued by regular appeal. Also, the issue fails 
to fall within the "unusual circumstances" outlined in 
Brown. Therefore, the issue is not a proper issue for 
review in a habeas corpus proceeding. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S CROSS-
EXA~1IN ATION OF THE APPELLANT CON-
CERNING APPELLANT'S PRIOR CONVIC-
TIONS 'VAS NOT IMPROPER OR PREJUDI-
CIAL. 
Notwithstanding that this issue should have been 
raised during appellant's regular appeal, the alleged 
improper inquiries will be discussed in order to demon-
strate that the inquiries did not prejudice the appellant 
nor were they improper. 
The appellant contends that there were three in-
stances where the cross-examination by the district at-
torney exceeded permissible examination. The first is 
the questioning concerning the appellant's discharge 
from the service ( T. 545) . Appellant alleges this ques-
tioning was neither probative nor relevant. It is difficult 
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t0 contend this questioning was prejudicial smce the 
appellant \ms being cross-examined, which places the 
credibility as a witness in issue. The appellant was asked 
what type of discharge he received from the service and 
he replied that he did not know ( T. 545). This could 
hardly be deemed prejudicial or improper. 
The second alleged instance of improper question-
mg was when appellant was asked the time and place 
of his prior felony convictions ( T. 545, 546, 547). This 
type of questioning is clearly permissible in Utah. See 
State v. Kazda, infra. and State v. Younglove, infra. 
The third allegation concerns questioning about 
the illegal wearing of a United States Army uniform 
( T. 547, 548) . This questioning could not be considered 
prejudicial nor is it a basis for appeal. This question-
~ng included the question of whether the appellant had 
been convicted of a felony for illegally wearing a United 
States .fumy uniform. An objection was raised by de-
fense counsel charging that this was not a felony and 
was irrelevant. The trial court sustained the objection 
granting remedy to the defense and preventing error 
( T. 548). Appellant cannot now claim error when he 
was granted a remedy at trial by the court sustaining 
his objection. In Velasques v. Pratt, supra, the Court 
discusses the procedure for redressing claimed error. 
The opinion says that there is first an obligation to call 
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an error to the trial court's attention and seek remedy, 
443 P.2d at 1022. In the case at bar, defense counsel 
met this obligation. Velasquez goes on to say: 
" ... that failing, there was next a duty to seek review 
and correction on appeal." 443 P.2d at 1022 (Emphasis 
added). In the instant case the attempt to seek a remedy 
did not fail since the objection was sustained, and there-
fore, there is nothing to correct on appeal. It is clear 
that this line of questioning was not allowed to advanre 
to the point of being improper or prejudicial. 
The second alleged improper questioning concern-
ing prior felonies deserves further discussion. The scope 
of this questioning included questioning as to whether 
the appellant had been convicted of a felony, the num-
ber of felony convictions, when and where they were 
committed, and what those felonies were. This scope 
of questioning is permissible under Utah case law. More-
over, this questioning is authorized by statute. 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-24-9 ( 1953), requires that 
a witness must, among other things, " ... answer as to 
the fact of his previous conviction of felony." This type 
of questioning has been developed by judicial decision. 
In State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 
( 1963) , the court was confronted with an allegation of 
error because of the cross-examination of the defendant 
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as to prior convictions. The court discharged this alle-
gation by saying: 
"'Vhen an accused voluntarily takes the 
witness stand he may be asked whether or not 
he has ever been convicted of a felony .... 
If the accused answers in the affirmative, he 
may ask the nature of the felony. Further, the 
accused may be asked if he has been convicted 
of more than one felony, and if so, the type 
and nature thereof." Id. at 409. 
The questioning in the case at bar falls within the per-
missible limits of questioning outlined in Kazda. 
In a more recent decision the Court was again con-
fronting this issue. State v. Younglove, 17 Utah 2d 268, 
409 P.2d 125 ( 1965). In this case the defendant, in a 
bastardy action, took the witness stand in his own de-
fense. On cross-examination the trial court required him 
to respond to questions relating to ·what his prior felony 
was and when it was committed, among other things, Id. 
at 126. The court did not hold that these questions went 
beyond the permissible scope of questioning. So it is in 
the case at bar; the questioning by the district attorney 
simply asked the permissible what, where, and when 
about prior felonies which is not improper or prejudicial. 
The questioning did not venture into the area of im-
proper questioning which are questions that seek "details 
or circumstances" of the felony. See discussion in State 
v. Younglove, supra, at 126. 
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It is important to understand the reason for allow-
ing such questions about a witness's prior felony con-
victions. In State v. Kazda, supra, the court said that its 
purpose was to affect his credibility as a witness. 382 
P.2d 409. In State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 
412 ( 1961), a case cited by appellant in support of his 
position, the court again said that the purpose of allow-
ing questioning as to prior felony convictions is to allow 
a witness's credibility to be impeached. 361 P.2d at 413. 
The appellant cites Dickson and quotes from the 
opinion in an attempt to show that this evidence of prior 
felonies should have been excluded as it is an attempt 
to show a bad reputation and relying on that for convic-
tion (Appellant's Brief at 14) . A closer analysis of this 
case is needed in order to fully understand its meaning 
and significance. Dickson stands for the proposition 
that the previously defined limits of questioning about 
prior felony convictions is a valid use of cross-examina-
tion. 361 P.2d at 413. But, in Dickson, "the prosecutor 
pressed beyond that." Id. at 413. The Court did hold 
the purpose of certain questioning to be the showing of 
a bad reputation and casting aspersions on the defend-
ant, but this particular questioning was not about a prior 
felony conviction. 
Rather it was about a crime that the defendant had 
only been charged with. Id. at 414. The questioning 
in the case at bar was whether the appellant had been 
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convicted of a felony, not charged with a crime. The 
only questioning that could possibly relate to Dickson 
was that concerning the illegal wearing of a United 
States Army Uniform, which, of course, was not ad-
mitted due to the trial court's sustaining of the defense's 
objection. 
The questioning that is alleged by appellant to be 
improper and prejudicial is clearly proper under both 
statute and judicial decisions. _Moreover, if the question-
ing could possibly be considered improper by any line 
of reasoning, it could not be deemed of such significance 
as to result in substantial injustice. vVhether justice was 
done and guilt established is the determination that must 
be made in habeas corpus proceedings. Brown v. Tur-
ner, supra, at 969, 970. In the case at bar substantial 
justice was clearly the end product of the trial. Fur-
ther, if the questioning were considered error, it could 
not be considered substantial error. In Alires v. Turner_ 
22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P .2d 241 ( 1969), a case wherein 
a writ of habeas corpus was granted, the Utah Supreme 
Court expressed the policy of our law. The Court de-
clared: 
" ... it is the policy of our law, established 
both by statute and decision, that we do not 
reverse for mere error or irregularity, but only 
where it is substantial and prejudicial. That 
is, not unless the error is of sufficient import-
17 
ance that it might have had some effect upon 
the result." Id. at 242. 
It can be concluded that the alleged improper ques-
tioning was not improper or prejudicial and therefore 
it cannot be the basis for granting a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the trial court's denial of 
petitioner's writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed by 
this court. The first issue raised by appellant, concern-
ing an alleged illegal search and seizure, is substantially 
the same issue raised by appellant on his original appeal 
from his conviction. This attempt to relitigate issues 
already ruled upon by this court should not be counten-
enced in our procedure. This position is fully supported 
by case law in Utah. Similarly, the second issue raised 
by appellant, concerning alleged improper questioning 
by the district attorney, should not be reviewed by the 
court as it should have been raised on regular appeal 
Appellant is attempting to turn the time-honored pro-
cedure of habeas corpus into another appellate review. 
Again, case law in Utah rejects this use of the habeas 
corpus procedure. Further, the inquiries made by the 
district attorney, that appellant alleges were improper, 
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are not improper nor did they prejudice the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. RO.MNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney 
General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
